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ABSTRACT 
 
The video game industry has blossomed from a niche 
hobby into a mainstream cultural industry, outpacing global 
box office sales in annual revenue. Yet the price of a video 
game has barely increased since the industry’s inception, 
and the current standard price point of sixty dollars has 
survived for over a decade. Competitive market forces drive 
companies to invest ever more time and money into creating 
increasingly complex software in order to remain on the 
cutting edge of graphics and design, while simultaneously 
increasing revenue. Thus, video game developers and 
publishers have developed a multitude of alternative money-
making services to provide revenue beyond the initial sale of 
a game. Of these, the one technique that has garnered the 
most attention, and the most legislative scrutiny, is the “loot 
box.” Through this system, players are allowed to pay a sum 
of real-world currency in exchange for receiving one or 
more random in-game items. This technique simulates 
gambling practices yet escapes current gambling oversight, 
leaving games containing this technique available to 
anyone. This includes vulnerable populations that do not 
have the capacity for rational spending, such as minors and 
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those suffering from gambling addiction. Though loot boxes 
stubbornly persist in existing titles and popular franchises, 
market forces are slowly phasing out the practice. While 
current regulatory forces discuss loot boxes, other 
monetization methods are rising to replace them and no law 
currently stands in the way of their return. Efforts should be 
focused toward creating a video game distributor regulatory 
board, fostering parental education regarding electronic 
parental controls, and enacting long-term legislation at 
state and federal levels to prevent similar issues from 
occurring in future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine a slot machine that acted just as any ordinary slot 
machine would, but once every three hours, the slot machine 
allowed you to play one spin on it for free. Now, assume that a child, 
or a recovering gambling addict, wanted to walk through a room 
filled with these machines, carrying your personal credit card, 
unsupervised, and it is completely legal (and encouraged) for them 
to use these machines. Most would immediately decline to risk their 
finances in such a manner, for the same reason we would hesitate to 
do so in the lobby of a hotel in Las Vegas: minors and problem 
gamblers are likely to be uncontrollably drawn to these machines 
and spend irresponsible amounts of money.1 Yet, with the advent of 
loot boxes and other randomized microtransactions, this situation is 
analogous to our current reality. 
The loot box exists as a randomized reward system implemented 
in video games and brought into mainstream gaming culture by the 
release of games such as Overwatch.2 While playing the game, 
players are fed small trickles of free loot boxes filled with 
randomized in-game digital items, ranging from rare and amazing 
to common and dull; however, should a player wish to open another 
box immediately, one is always available to them for a fee.3 
This digital reward system thus touches upon the core aspects of 
gambling (consideration, chance, and value) yet escapes modern 
legislative or regulatory scrutiny.4 As a result, minors and problem 
gamblers are exposed to the same psychological triggers as 
traditional gambling, but from a more available access point: their 
                                                 
1 NATASHA DOW SCHULL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN: MACHINE GAMBLING IN 
LAS VEGAS 254-70 (4th ed. 2014); Amy Bestman et al., Children’s Attitudes 
towards Electronic Gambling Machines: an Exploratory Qualitative Study of 
Children who Attend Community Clubs, 14 HARM REDUC. J. 20 (2017). 
2 David J. Castillo, Unpacking the Loot Box: How Gaming’s Latest 
Monetization Model System Flirts with Traditional Gambling Methods, 59 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 165, 169-72 (2019). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 183-93. 
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phones and video game consoles.5 The results have been predictable: 
families suffering from financial devastation,6 an overabundance of 
irrational spending on chances for worthless virtual property,7 an 
increase in problem gambling behavior in the developing minds of 
minors,8 and a panicked yet uninformed response from legislative 
and regulatory authorities.9 
The world is slowly catching on, and four years after the rise of 
the loot box to prominence, both the private market and public 
regulatory bodies are beginning to restrict the practice from 
development.10 Yet while the world deliberates over the use of loot 
boxes, the practice persists in its most famous and profitable 
examples.11 To complicate matters, as the loot box is phased out, 
                                                 
5 See David Zendle & Paul Cairns, Loot Boxes are Again Linked to Problem 
Gambling: Results of a Replication Study, PLOS ONE (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213194; see also David Zendle & Paul 
Cairns, Paying for Loot Boxes is Linked to Problem Gambling, Regardless of 
Specific Features like Cash-Out and Pay-to-Win, 102 COMP. IN HUM. BEHAV. 181 
(2020), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563219302468. 
6 Zoe Kleinman, ‘The Kids Emptied our Bank Account Playing FIFA’, BBC 
NEWS (July 9, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48908766. 
7 Alex Walker, Someone Spent Over $150,000 In Microtransactions OA 
Transformers Game, KOTAKU (Oct. 14, 2019), https://kotaku.com/someone-
spent-over-150-000-in-microtransactions-on-a-t-1839040151. 
8 Country’s Top Mental Health Nurse Warns Video Games Pushing Young 
People into ‘Under the Radar’ Gambling, NHS England (Jan. 18, 2020), 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/2020/01/countrys-top-mental-health-nurse-warns-
video-games-pushing-young-people-into-under-the-radar-gambling/. 
9 Castillo, supra note 2. 
10 Elise Favis, Borderlands 3 Won’t Have Loot Boxes, GAME INFORMER (May 
1, 2019), https://www.gameinformer.com/2019/05/01/borderlands-3-wont-have-
loot-boxes; Wesley Yin-Poole, The Netherlands Declares Some Loot Boxes are 
Gambling, EUROGAMER (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2018-04-19-the-netherlands-declares-some-
loot-boxes-are-gambling; Paul Tassi, EA Surrenders in Belgian FIFA Ultimate 
Team Loot Box Fight, Raising Potential Red Flags, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2019/01/29/ea-surrenders-in-belgian-
fifa-ultimate-team-loot-box-fight-raising-potential-red-flags/. 
11 See The Overwatch Loot Box store page, BLIZZARD, 
https://us.shop.battle.net/en-us/product/overwatch-loot-box (last visited Jan. 20, 
2020) (showing Blizzard’s store page where consumers can purchase loot boxes 
for the game Overwatch). 
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other innovative monetization schemes are slowly being introduced 
to replace the lost revenue.12 
Ideally, new systems would be put in place to augment the 
existing remedies in ensuring above-the-board revenue streams for 
video game developers. Video games in the United States have 
enjoyed few, if any, regulations from government bodies regarding 
their sale, relying chiefly on their self-regulatory body, the 
Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB).13 Yet the ESRB has 
declined to implement meaningful regulation regarding loot boxes 
and has a financial incentive to continue ignoring the issue at hand.14 
Outside of the United States, countries have begun to respond to 
the business practice with a myriad of regulatory schemes. In 
western countries, such as the United Kingdom, the loot box has 
arisen as a new problem that the population and legislature have 
found themselves unprepared to deal with.15 Some East Asian 
countries, such as Korea and Japan, have dealt with the issue for 
some time and have taken some first, if ineffective, steps to ensure 
adequate protections.16 China has gone the furthest, enforcing a 
recent law that curtails the amount of time and money minors are 
allowed to spend on games.17 By examining these regulatory 
responses and the results, the United States is in a position to set 
standards that not only address the issue fairly between developers 
and consumers, but also to prevent similar predatory practices from 
being utilized in gaming’s future. 
                                                 
12 Stephen Totilo, Ubisoft Explains Assassin’s Creed Odyssey’s 
Microtransactions and Some of the Math Behind Them, KOTAKU (Oct. 9, 2018), 
https://kotaku.com/ubisoft-explains-assassin-s-creed-odyssey-s-microtransa-
1829635195. 
13 Castillo, supra note 2, at 197-98. 
14 Jason Schreier, ESRB Says it Doesn’t See Loot Boxes as Gambling, 
KOTAKU (Oct. 11, 2017), https://kotaku.com/esrb-says-it-doesnt-see-loot-boxes-
as-gambling-1819363091. 
15 NHS England, supra note 8. 
16 Kevin Liu, A Global Analysis into Loot Boxes: Is it “Virtually” Gambling?, 
28 WASH INT’L L.J. 763, 780-84 (2019). 
17 Javier C. Hernandez & Albee Zhang, 90 Minutes a Day, until 10 P.M.: 
China Sets Rules for Young Gamers, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/business/china-video-game-ban-
young.html. 
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Ultimately, new systems, both public and private, must be 
implemented to ensure the financial safety of those that are 
vulnerable to uncontrollable psychological gambling triggers. 
This Article aims to examine how the loot box has evolved in 
the current digital marketplace, its effects on the market and society, 
the current regulatory state of the loot box, and potential solutions 
for both loot boxes and for other, future schemes. 
The first Part will discuss how the loot box originated as the 
video game industry shifted from flat-rate physical goods to modern 
day digital marketplaces, and how the technique of “whaling” 
enables developers to thrive entirely off of microtransaction income 
alone. It will also discuss the results of this practice, and how 
populations vulnerable to psychological gambling triggers are 
affected. 
The second Part will discuss the U.S. legislation and case law 
regarding traditional gambling and digital gambling, demonstrating 
how loot boxes and digital gambling are currently legally 
distinguishable from traditional gambling. 
The third Part will discuss the global reaction to these practices, 
and how individual countries have identified the issues at play and 
reacted to them. 
The fourth and final Part will discuss potential solutions for both 
the United States and private gaming industry to protect the 
inventive and entrepreneurial spirit of game development while 
tempering that innovative spirit with anti-predatory regulation. 
 
I. MARKET THEORY, PRACTICE, AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
A.  Free Market, Free Market Forces 
 
Video games have enjoyed a strange state of price stability for 
the past twenty years.18 In the early days of the industry, when 
standards were few and far between, prices could vary between forty 
                                                 
18 Colin Moriarty, The Real Cost of Gaming: Inflation, Time, and Purchasing 
Power, IGN ENTERTAINMENT, INC. (Oct. 15, 2013), 
https://www.ign.com/articles/2013/10/15/the-real-cost-of-gaming-inflation-time-
and-purchasing-power. 
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and eighty dollars for a single title.19 In such an emerging industry, 
new entrants to the market attempted to set new standards in game 
production with varied leaps of innovation.20 Games could be 
shipped either in a cartridge or on CD, be played on a home 
computer or on a home console, or have any number of unique 
control methods.21 Home game consoles themselves could have add-
ons on top of add-ons, enhancing the complexity of both hardware 
and software.22 
By the mid-1990s, video game production practice began to 
solidify. As Nintendo and others claimed market dominance, the 
home console became the de-facto noun one used to describe a video 
game.23 Thanks to a combination of development and production 
costs, as well as some tacit collusion in the market, prices began to 
normalize around fifty dollars.24 Several years later, as Microsoft 
entered the market, prices increased to sixty dollars per game for 
Microsoft’s Xbox 360 and Sony’s PlayStation 3.25 
For nearly fifteen years, the base price of a standard game for a 
home video game console has rarely, if ever, risen above sixty 
                                                 
19 Michelle Yan & Ben Gilbert, Here’s the Reason Most New Console Video 
Games Cost $60, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/why-video-games-always-cost-60-dollars-
2018-10. 
20 Scott Gallagher and Seung Ho Park, Innovation and Competition in 
Standard-Based Industries: A Historical Analysis of the U.S. Home Video Game 
Market, 49 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 80 (2002). 
21 Michael Poh, Evolution of Home Video Game Consoles: 1967 – 2011, 
HONGKIAT, https://www.hongkiat.com/blog/evolution-of-home-video-game-
consoles-1967-2011/ (last updated May 8, 2018). 
22 See Rollin Bishop, Misguided Console Add-Ons You Might Have Tried to 
Forget, THE MARY SUE (Sep. 9, 2011), https://www.themarysue.com/misguided-
console-add-ons/. 
23 JEFF RYAN, SUPER MARIO: HOW NINTENDO CONQUERED AMERICA 117-29 
(2012).  
24 Kyle Orland & Jonathan Gitlin, Why Retail Console Games Have Never 
Been Cheaper, Historically, ARS TECHNICA (June 30, 2013), 
https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2013/06/why-retail-console-games-have-never-
been-cheaper-historically/; see also Kate Cox, The Competition Is As Fake As The 
Blood: Why New Video Games Are Always The Same Price, THE CONSUMERIST 
(Mar. 15, 2014), https://consumerist.com/2014/03/15/the-competition-is-as-fake-
as-the-blood-why-new-video-games-are-always-the-same-price/. 
25 Yan, supra note 19. 
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dollars.26 This is a problem for developers and publishers due to 
several compounding factors. 
First, the ever-present market force of inflation has driven the 
real value of a sixty dollar purchase down twenty-five percent in the 
past fifteen years.27 A sixty dollar purchase in 2005 is equivalent to 
an eighty dollar purchase in 2019, yet the price of a game has 
remained constant over those years.28 Investors typically prefer that 
their investments generate enough revenue to counter the effects of 
inflation.29 Even better, investors hope that their individual 
investments “beat the market,” or a typical market index fund 
(otherwise, investors would simply invest in the index fund).30 
This would ordinarily not be a problem if, over time, the goods 
became cheaper to produce, and this is reflected somewhat in the 
industry’s move from physical CD/DVD production to purely 
digital market distribution.31 However, as games struggle to remain 
competitive, more and more money must be invested in 
development costs to retain a technologically competitive edge, 
outpacing the benefits of digital distribution.32 
Again, this would not be a problem if the industry was able to 
grow its market to accommodate more mainstream audiences. 
However, the video game industry has struggled in increasing its 
new users by a sustainable amount: reports show that, over the most 
popular services, new users have increased by a paltry three to four 
percent per year.33 
                                                 
26 Id. 
27 This can be verified by using standard inflation calculations, achievable by 
utilizing an inflation calculator such as https://westegg.com/inflation/. 
28 Id.; Yan, supra note 19. 
29 Solnik, B.H., Inflation and Optimal Portfolio Choices, 13 J. OF FIN. AND 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 903, 904-05 (1978). 
30 Joe Nocerra, How to Beat the Market, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/13/books/review/the-man-who-solved-the-
market-gregory-zuckerman.html. 
31 Orland, supra note 24. 
32 Jason Schreier, Why Video Games Cost so Much to Make, KOTAKU (Sept. 
18, 2017), https://kotaku.com/why-video-games-cost-so-much-to-make-
1818508211. 
33 See 2019 Video Game Industry Statistics, Trends, and Data, WEPC, 
https://www.wepc.com/news/video-game-statistics/ (last updated Nov. 2019). 
Specifically, listing a decreased retention rate and a new user acquisition rate of 
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If the industry continued its sixty-dollar one-time-purchase 
trend, it would quickly find itself unprofitable and unattractive to 
investors.34  
 
B.  Digital Marketplaces and Microtransactions 
 
Initially, games made all of their money with the same business 
model as VHS tapes: by selling individual physical copies of games 
to individual end-users.35 This was the entirety of the transaction: 
one game, one user, and one-time revenue.36 
However, in the 2000s, the internet transitioned from being an 
office email-based curiosity to a ubiquitous household service.37 
With the commonality of the internet, several advantageous 
developments occurred in the video game industry. First, games 
now had the capability to host competitive “multiplayer” games 
between users over an internet connection.38 Second, purely digital 
marketplaces could spring up, selling copies of games to individuals 
entirely over the internet (a great advantage to developers, who no 
longer had to manufacture and distribute CD/DVDs).39 Third, games 
                                                 
3.9% on Steam, the most prominent video game store on personal computers. 
Accurate industry data is generally difficult to acquire, so the precise number of 
new users is a best estimate from available data. 
34 Prateek Agarwal, Economics of Microtransactions in Video Games, 
INTELLIGENT ECONOMIST (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/economics-of-microtransactions/; Lewis 
Packwood, Microtransactions and Loot Boxes in Video Games – Are They Pure 
Greed or a Modern Necessity?, GAMESRADAR (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.gamesradar.com/microtransactions-and-loot-boxes-in-video-games-
are-they-pure-greed-or-a-modern-necessity/. 
35 JLuo, Rethinking the Video Game Business Model, HBS DIGITAL 
INITIATIVE (Apr. 24, 2018), https://digital.hbs.edu/platform-
digit/submission/rethinking-the-video-game-business-model/. 
36 Id. 
37 Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000-2015, 
PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-
2000-2015/. 
38 Riad Chikani, The History of Gaming: An Evolving Community, 
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 31, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/31/the-history-of-
gaming-an-evolving-community/. 
39 Id. 
9
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could now be updated, or “patched,” to fix software issues and add 
content online.40 
In this environment, combined with the economic pressures 
detailed earlier, game developers had the brilliant idea of selling 
additional digital content for their games over the digital 
marketplace.41 This practice, known as “downloadable content,” 
“DLC,” or “microtransactions,” was seen as an additive property 
that enhanced a player’s experience of a game.42 Game developers 
also benefited, as they now had an extra revenue stream for their 
titles.43 However, developers soon began to take advantage of this 
system, selling games that were half-finished at full price with 
additional content carved into pieces on the marketplace, or had 
content on the physical disc blocked to players unless players paid a 
fee digitally.44 
Games even began to organize their entire revenue stream 
around microtransactions, most prominently with the rise of the 
smartphone app marketplace.45 In this brave new market that was 
able to reach far more consumers than any traditional gaming 
platform could have ever dreamed, the emphasis was on which 
games would be easy for players to spend a moment or two while 
they were sitting, bored, on their phone.46 A multitude of cheap-to-
                                                 
40 Jimmy Tran, How Digital Distribution is Changing the Scope of Gaming, 
VENTUREBEAT (May 6, 2014), 
https://venturebeat.com/community/2014/05/06/how-digital-distribution-is-
changing-the-scope-of-gaming/. 
41 Kishan Mistry, P(l)aying to Win: Loot Boxes, Microtransactions 
Monetization, and a Proposal for Self-Regulation in the Video Game Industry, 71 
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 537, 539 (2018). 
42 Castillo, supra note 2, at 167-69. 
43 Id. 
44 See S.G. Brown, Incomplete Games: The History of a Shady Practice, 
VIDEO CHUMS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://videochums.com/article/incomplete-
games-the-history-of-a-shady-practice; Jim Sterling, Roadmap to Nowhere (The 
Jimquisition), YOUTUBE (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8VKNyrphXA; Jason Schreier, Capcom 
Says On-Disc DLC is for ‘Easy Compatibility,’ File Size, KOTAKU (Mar. 5, 2012), 
https://kotaku.com/capcom-says-on-disc-dlc-is-for-easy-compatibility-file-
5890630.  
45 Castillo, supra note 2, at 167-69. 
46 Id. 
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produce games were developed around the “free-to-play” model, 
wherein a user could indefinitely play a game at no cost; however, 
the game would be filled with “gatekeeping” that would put 
psychological pressure on players to spend money in order to fulfill 
goals.47 The revenue streams from mobile gaming quickly caught up 
to that achieved by traditional gaming platforms, where even today 
the market share for mobile games remains roughly even with 
traditional gaming platforms.48 
 
C.  Birth of the Loot Box 
 
By 2015, it was clear that the concept of the microtransaction 
was here to stay. Despite consumer grumbling, there was never a 
time wherein any consumer, government, or market force would 
persuade game developers to move away from the model.49 In this 
environment, the “loot box” was born. 
Though the concept had existed in other games, the release of 
Overwatch by Blizzard Entertainment enshrined the term and the 
concept in the gaming zeitgeist.50 The concept was simple: every so 
often, the game would reward players with a box (called a “Loot 
Box” in-game) which, when opened, contained a random selection 
of digital cosmetic goods which players could use to change the 
appearance of their in-game characters.51 These goods would be 
tiered by rarity – the most common goods may offer a simple change 
of color palette of a character, but the rarest would grant a character 
a completely redesigned costume.52 
The business model was simple as well. Players would receive a 
loot box frequently as they began the game but would soon have to 
invest ever-greater hours to earn additional boxes.53 However, 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Id.; Omer Kaplan, Mobile Gaming is a $68.5 Billion Global Business, and 
Investors Are Buying In, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/22/mobile-gaming-mints-money/. 
49 See Agarwal, supra note 34. 
50 Castillo, supra note 2, at 170-71. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Paul Tassi, The Math Behind Why Overwatch’s Loot Boxes Are Exhausting 
to Unlock, FORBES (Jun. 10, 2016), 
11
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borrowing from other microtransaction models, players could pay 
real money in order to purchase additional boxes, each of which had 
the chance of containing the items players wanted.54 With additional 
outfits becoming available in the prize table over time, especially 
over seasonal events (such as costumes around Halloween), 
Overwatch could guarantee not only a constant revenue stream but 
also constant player engagement with the game.55 
The loot box practice soon branched out from Overwatch and 
began to take root in many games throughout 2017 and 2018.56 
However, as more people became aware of this mechanic, some 
began to wonder: is a mechanic where a player pays real money to 
obtain a randomized result just another form of gambling? And if 
so, how does it affect players and those around them? 
 
D.  The Loot Box, as Seen Today 
 
Today, the loot box still thrives in several high-profile games as 
a valuable source of revenue generation.57 
Overwatch and similarly styled games continue to use the loot 
box practice to this day.58 Blizzard Entertainment, Overwatch’s 
developer, stated that out of the $7.18 billion it earned in fiscal year 
2017, $4 billion came from in-game purchases of its loot boxes.59 
With statistics like these, most game developers implemented and 
maintained loot box systems as a matter of common sense.60 
                                                 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2016/06/10/the-math-behind-why-
overwatchs-loot-boxes-are-exhausting-to-unlock/. 
54 Castillo, supra note 2, at 170-71. 
55 Id.  
56 Edwin Hong, Loot Boxes: Gambling for the Next Generation, 46 W. ST. L. 
REV. 61, 65 (2019). 
57 Id.  
58 Id. 
59 Rob Thubron, Over Half of Activision-Blizzard’s $7.16 Billion Yearly 
Revenue Came from Microtransactions, TECHSPOT (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.techspot.com/news/73230-over-half-activision-blizzard-716-
billion-yearly-revenue.html. 
60 See Paul Tassi, In Pursuit Of ‘Hearthstone’ Whales, Blizzard Will Drain 
The Ocean, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2017/11/10/in-pursuit-of-hearthstone-
whales-blizzard-will-drain-the-ocean/; Samuel Horti, How the Loot Box 
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Activision Blizzard, the owner of Blizzard Entertainment, has even 
filed patents for methods designed to increase the number of players 
who purchase loot boxes, which demonstrates (through the time and 
expenditure required for the patenting process) just how valuable the 
company considers loot boxes to be.61 
Sports games, in particular, are a valuable resource for loot box 
practice. The FIFA series, the best-selling sports video game 
franchise in the world, frequently uses the loot box structure to offer 
players the ability to obtain footballers, some with bigger names and 
better performance, in order to create fantasy soccer teams.62 Most 
egregiously, NBA 2K20, the latest installment of the NBA 2K 
franchise, utilizes virtual slot machines, prize wheels, and pachinko 
machines, all of which can be played with real currency. They are 
also all considered to be using loot box-style mechanics instead of 
their apparent nature: gambling machines.63 
Mobile games (that is, games which can be played on a mobile 
phone) are the largest implementers of loot boxes.64 With a 
multitude of free-to-play titles directly in the hands of anyone with 
a smartphone, mobile games reach a larger market than any 
traditional gaming media.65 To generate revenue, many of these 
titles utilize loot box practices, both to give players power-ups while 
                                                 
Controversy Shaped Gaming in 2017, PC GAMER (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.pcgamer.com/how-the-loot-box-controversy-shaped-gaming-in-
2017/; Wes Fenlon, The Case for and against Loot Boxes, According to 
Developers, PC GAMER (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.pcgamer.com/the-case-for-
and-against-loot-boxes-according-to-developers/. 
61 U.S. Patent No. 9,789,406 (issued Oct. 17, 2017). 
62 Castillo, supra note 2, at 172. 
63 Ethan Gach, I Feel Gross Just Watching NBA 2K20’s Loot Box Trailer, 
KOTAKU (Aug. 8, 2019), https://kotaku.com/i-feel-gross-just-watching-nba-
2k20-s-loot-box-trailer-1837674621. 
64 Martha Busby, Loot Boxes Increasingly Common in Video Games Despite 
Addiction Concerns, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2019/nov/22/loot-boxes-increasingly-
common-in-video-games-despite-addiction-concerns. 
65 Anna Tobin, Is Mobile Phone Gaming Taking Over from Console 
Gaming?, FORBES (Oct. 11, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/annatobin/2018/10/11/is-mobile-phone-gaming-
taking-over-from-console-gaming/. 
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playing the game and to give the player cosmetic items to enhance 
their gameplay experience.66 
 
E.  Hook, Habit, Hobby: The Art of Whaling 
 
The economic incentive for a developer is clear on its surface: 
implementing loot box systems in games creates an additional 
revenue stream. However, after developers implemented the system, 
they still faced the looming need to generate even more revenue in 
their next fiscal year. Developers therefore had to figure out the most 
profitable way to utilize loot box practices.67 
A popular analysis of free-to-play games with microtransaction 
revenue structures is the “Hook, Habit, Hobby” model, most 
famously articulated by Torulf Jernstrom, the CEO of Finnish game 
developer Tribeflame.68 The model lays out the general principle 
behind why these games are both popular and profitable. 
The Hook is something that can get players interested in playing 
the game.69 This traditionally was done with inventive and 
engrossing gameplay with high production value, which to an extent 
is still implemented today.70 However, with newer games on mobile 
phones, this can be done by offering immediate, free rewards that 
would otherwise only be available after playing for a long time or 
through paying real currency.71 
In the Hook phase, when the player is interested in the game and 
is investing their time in it, successful developers will implement an 
“icebreaker” offer.72 An icebreaker is a massive discount or deal on 
purchasable rewards that would otherwise take a long time to earn 
for free.73 Icebreakers can also be delivered on a short timer, a “buy 
                                                 
66 Agarwal, supra note 34. 
67 Id. 
68 Torulf Jernstrom, Let’s Go Whaling: A Guide to Monetization through In-
App Purchases, POCKETGAMER (Sept. 2, 2016), 
https://www.pocketgamer.biz/comment-and-opinion/63871/monetisation-lets-
go-whaling/. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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now or lose the deal forever” sort of flash sale, or offered just when 
the player would want or need the icebreaker, in order to get players 
to act quickly without thinking too hard about their purchase.74 Once 
a player has spent real currency in a game their internal 
psychological barriers break down, which makes a player far more 
likely to spend real currency on the game in the future.75 
Getting players invested in the Hook phase also more easily 
helps them transition into the Habit phase.76 The Ikea Effect states 
that people will overvalue something that they have spent a lot of 
time and investment in, even if the base product is basically 
worthless.77 When players spend their time and money in the game, 
they feel they should keep coming back because they have created 
something valuable and worthwhile.78 
In the Habit phase, the flow of premium content slows while 
players are investing their time in the game.79 In this phase, the game 
is designed to slow player progression and, in turn, shift sales to 
rewards focused on increasing player progression.80 Content is 
offered in this phase that pays off over a longer period of time; this 
keeps players coming back to the game in order to extract the full 
value of their item.81 The Habit phase is a transition phase, hoping 
to convert a habitual player into a long-term, devoted player.82 
Loot boxes (or gachas, or Skinner Boxes) are most effective in 
this model, due to the psychological principles of operant 
conditioning.83 Players are rewarded for completing tasks and will 
                                                 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.; see also Liu, supra note 16 at 773. A “gacha” is the East Asian 
precursor and counterpart to the loot box, referring to a game that uses the 
elements of a practical gacha machine (essentially a gumball machine, but instead 
of gumballs the machine dispenses a random toy in a capsule) in a digital game 
by awarding different characters or heroes to players. A “Skinner Box” is an 
operant conditioning chamber in which animals will learn behaviors in response 
to certain stimuli and will continue those behaviors even when the stimuli is 
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appreciate the thrill of getting a random reward for their efforts.84 
Randomized rewards also prevent players from progressing too 
quickly throughout the game; after all, developers do not want 
players to feel they have extracted the full value of the game too 
quickly, otherwise developers have just lost a customer.85 In chasing 
the high of progression and random chance, players will be most 
tempted to purchase loot boxes in this phase.86 
When a player has invested enough time and energy into the 
game, they transition into the Hobby phase. This is characterized by 
“superfans” who have invested so much time in the game that they 
are near the limit of how far they can progress in the game.87 In this 
phase, the rewarding content is geared toward making a player feel 
important, like they have surmounted some challenge, and offering 
them advantages in their future play.88 The reasoning for this is 
twofold. 
First, Hobby players are more likely to be large spenders in these 
games, as they feel the game is worth their time and investment 
(much like any other traditional hobby).89 By offering them perks 
that make them feel special, while also providing them with 
challenges that they are able to complete through their continued 
time and investment, developers can keep these long-term players 
without any cap to the players’ spending.90 Most importantly, the 
perks offered to Hobby players should make them highly visible to 
all other players, especially newcomers.91 
                                                 
dispensed at random intervals or is removed entirely. 
84 Jernstrom, supra note 68. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Heather Alexandra, Activision Patents Matchmaking that Encourages 
Players to Buy Microtransactions, KOTAKU (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://kotaku.com/activision-patents-matchmaking-that-encourages-players-
1819630937; Juho Hamari et al., Why do Players Buy In-Game Content? An 
Empirical Study on Concrete Purchase Motivations, 68 COMP. IN HUM. BEHAV. 
543 (2017). 
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Second, as Hobby players are now highly visible, newcomers to 
the Hook phase will be able to see Hobby players and become 
inspired to reach the Hobby players’ level of success.92 This will 
encourage Hook players to purchase an icebreaker and get them 
started on the path to becoming a Hobby player.93 
Only a small percentage of newcomers will end up in the Hobby 
phase.94 However, this is sufficient for most companies to sustain 
their business model.95 Clash of Clans and Clash Royale, two high-
profile mobile games, utilize the Hook, Habit, Hobby technique to 
great effect: Clash of Clans has grossed $6.4 billion in revenue since 
its release in 2012, and Clash Royale has grossed $2.5 billion since 
its release in 2016.96 
This small percentage of players that end up in the Hobby phase 
are colloquially known in the industry as “whales,” a small group of 
people who spend a large amount of money.97 A developer’s goal in 
utilizing a microtransaction model is to foster a sufficient quantity 
of whales so that their business can generate as much revenue as 
possible at minimal cost for a long period of time.98 While the ideal 
whale for developers is someone with a lot of extra money, not 
enough time, and a willingness to spend that money on their game, 
developers end up attracting people far more vulnerable to these 
tactics than the ideal customer.99 
 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Jernstrom, supra note 68. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Nicole Carpenter, ‘Clash Royale’ Surpassed $2.5 Billion in Revenue in Its 
Three Years Since Launch, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolecarpenter/2019/03/05/clash-royale-
surpassed-2-5-billion-in-revenue-in-its-three-years-since-launch/. 
97 Liu, supra note 16, at 775. 
98 Jernstrom, supra note 68. 
99 Mike Rose, Chasing the Whale: Examining the Ethics of Free-To-Play 
Games, GAMASUTRA (July 9, 2013), 
https://www.gamasutra.com/view/feature/195806/chasing_the_whale_examinin
g_the_.php.  
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F.  At-Risk Populations, Predictable Results 
 
As loot boxes have remained and ingrained themselves into 
fundamental game design, two populations have emerged as 
casualties of the standard whaling strategy: minors100 and problem 
gamblers.101 
Minors are vulnerable to whaling techniques for precisely the 
same reasons that minors are not allowed to gamble in any state in 
the United States: minors are generally atrocious at making 
responsible decisions and choices with gambling behavior.102 
Minors are still in the process of exploring the intricacies of the 
world and may not understand the value of money, nor fully 
appreciate odds of betting and common logical fallacies related to 
betting.103 Developing brains in minors are also susceptible to 
incoming behavior signals, which may affect their long-term 
cognitive development and lead to gambling-related disorders later 
in life.104 
Yet the vast majority of games are developed with the intention 
of selling those games to persons under 18.105 Developing a game 
exclusively for persons 18 and older earns a game the dreaded 
Adults Only (AO) rating, which would exclude a sizeable market 
from purchasing the game, as discussed below in Section III.A.106 
                                                 
100 Elpido K. Cruz, The Psychological and Virtual Siege of Loot Boxes, 23 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 215, 217 (2019). 
101 Hong, supra note 56, at 62-63. 
102 See Nat’l Ctr. for Responsible Gaming, Talking with Children about 
Gambling, INT’L CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE GAMING (2008), 
https://www.icrg.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/ncrgtalktochildren2015hi.p
df (last visited Apr. 23, 2020). 
103 Zoe Kleinman, ‘My Son Spent £3,160 in One Game’, BBC NEWS (July 15, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48925623. 
104 Hannah Pitt et al., Factors that Influence Children’s Gambling Attitudes 
and Consumption Intentions: Lessons for Gambling Harm Prevention Research, 
Policies and Advocacy Strategies, 14 HARM REDUC. J. 11 (2017). 
105 Liu, supra note 16, at 773-74. 
106 See Schreier, supra note 14 (referring to game publishers’ unwillingness 
to have an AO (18+) rating attached to games); see also ESRB Ratings Guide, 
ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD, https://www.esrb.org/ratings-
guide/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (defining possible ratings for games, including 
M (17+) and AO(18+)). 
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Colorful advertising and cartoonish designs easily attract minors to 
games.107 With an ever-greater number of minors possessing 
smartphones with access to games, it is simple to create a multitude 
of free-to-play games for minors while not necessarily disclosing the 
microtransaction structure of the free-to-play game.108 Even in 
traditional gaming, microtransactions run the risk of making the 
money spent “magical,” because overall, the brains of minors “can’t 
process these virtual transactions because it’s not tangible to 
them.”109 
Leaving minors in control of their gaming decisions has had 
devastating consequences for some families. Stories abound of 
children spending thousands of dollars of their family’s money on 
loot boxes because they do not realize that the money being spent is 
real.110 Kanye West famously railed against in-app purchases, as his 
toddler North was making a purchase on their iPad “every five 
minutes,” even though the game was designed for “a 2-year-old.”111 
But some families do not have the capital necessary to survive these 
spending sprees. One famous story reported by the BBC told the tale 
of a family’s four children emptying their parents’ bank account in 
three weeks by purchasing loot boxes from FIFA.112 Other stories 
reported by the BBC detail minors spending £100, £700, £1,000, or 
even £2,000 on loot boxes in both traditional games and smartphone 
games.113 The problem is not simply localized to the United 
Kingdom. Minors in Canada have spent over $8,000 of their parents’ 
money on FIFA as well.114 From these case studies, one may see 
                                                 
107  Liu, supra note 16, at 773-74. 
108 Id. 
109 Julie Jargon, You Spent $1,500 on Virtual Bazookas? Kids are Splurging 
on Digital Goods, THE WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-spent-1-500-on-virtual-bazookas-kids-are-
splurging-on-digital-goods-11563291006. 
110 Id. 
111 Dante D’Orazio, Kanye West is Fed Up with In-App Purchases, THE 
VERGE (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/2015/10/10/9493905/kanye-
west-is-fed-up-about-in-app-purchases. 
112 Kleinman, supra note 6. 
113 Kleinman, supra note 103. 
114 Debra Kelly, Kids who Wasted Thousands of Dollars on Gaming, 
GRUNGE, https://www.grunge.com/29299/kids-wasted-thousands-dollars-
parents-money-games/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
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how minors, when given control of spending, are not able to control 
their behavior and may throw that money into activities that trigger 
primal reward instincts. 
Unfortunately, there has never been a systematic study of how 
much and how often minors actually spend on loot boxes. However, 
leading psychologists are concerned that the mere exposure to 
gambling-adjacent mechanics of loot boxes has the potential to 
create greater problems later in cognitive development.115 Exposing 
minors to these addictive behaviors normalizes these behaviors later 
on in life, keeping adults addicted to the sensation of gambling.116 
At present, minors are indeed exposed: one article conservatively 
estimated a total of fifty-seven million game players under the age 
of eighteen in the United States alone.117 Given that the loot box has 
enjoyed a center-stage presence in the video game market, it is likely 
that any minor exposed to video games has been exposed to at least 
one title that featured a loot box.  
In addition, the U.K. Gambling Commission has determined 
that, in 2018, at least twenty-five thousand minors in the United 
Kingdom are problem gamblers, with thirty-six thousand others 
classified as at-risk, via traditional gambling methods.118 In 2019, 
the numbers rose, with fifty-five thousand minors in the United 
Kingdom classified as having a gambling problem.119 By exposing 
these at-risk minors to gambling-adjacent mechanics in video 
games, these minors may manifest gambling-related disorders later 
on in their cognitive development, where it will be far harder to 
treat.120 
Parental controls, as they currently exist, cannot curb this 
practice by minors. While minors may attempt to work around these 
controls, the true danger lies in parents not even knowing what the 
                                                 
115 Pitt, supra note 104. 
116 Id. 
117 Liu, supra note 16, at 766. 
118 Mattha Busby, ‘Easy Trap to Fall Into’: Why Video-Game Loot Boxes 
Need Regulation, THE GUARDIAN (May 29, 2018, 1:50 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2018/may/29/gamers-politicians-
regulation-video-game-loot-boxes. 
119 NHS England, supra note 8. 
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controls are, how to use them, or that they even exist.121 Studies have 
shown that not even half of parents have set up parental controls for 
their children’s internet browsing activity, and the same is true for 
their children’s online gaming activity.122 Surveys have found that 
most parents do not even raise the issue of cybersecurity and online 
restrictions with their children.123 The reasons have been myriad, but 
the one commonality is that parents were unaware of these controls 
in the first place.124 
This raises the question: How are parents to learn of these 
limiting tools? While educational materials have been posted on the 
internet, these materials are only found by parents who are actively 
seeking to be informed.125 Parents who do not know that they do not 
know about parental controls will find themselves powerless to 
control their child’s spending until it is too late.126 Barring a nation-
wide movement to spread awareness akin to MADD or DARE, it is 
unlikely that contemporary parents will be able to fully understand 
the tools available to restrict access to potentially harmful activities, 
like gambling-adjacent loot boxes. 
The lesson is clear: minors are unable to control their spending 
on loot boxes, and existing parental controls are inadequately 
utilized to curb this spending. Yet developers are not incentivized to 
change their development strategies, because these young whales 
are far too profitable for them. 
Equally distressing is the pressure that loot box mechanics place 
on people, minors and adults, who have a gambling disorder or some 
                                                 
121 Monica Anderson, Parents, Teens and Digital Monitoring, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2016/01/07/parents-teens-
and-digital-monitoring/. 
122 Id.; see also Shahneila Saeed, Online Safety: A Pupil’s Perspective, 
DIGITAL SCHOOLHOUSE (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://www.digitalschoolhouse.org.uk/system/files/cms/docs/online-safety-
pupils-perspective-report-a4-WEB-0918.pdf; Holly Bentley et al., How Safe Are 
Our Children? 2019, NAT’L SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILD. 
(2019), https://learning.nspcc.org.uk/media/1747/how-safe-are-our-children-
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123 Saeed, supra note 122. 
124 Anderson, supra note 121. 
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other gambling problem (which may have been induced or 
exacerbated by prior loot box exposure).127 Those that have 
gambling disorders can take all possible steps to avoid temptation 
and relapse; however, the same fundamental forces of randomized 
chance in loot boxes can either force these people out of the video 
game market entirely or cause them to relapse back into compulsive, 
uncontrollable spending on randomized chance.128  
With disposable income, this breed of whale spends far more 
money on loot boxes, and does so more often than any other 
whale.129 Multiple case studies have been reported of people whose 
marriages have been destroyed, or who have been forced into 
bankruptcy because the ever-present nature of the loot box 
compelled them into a spending behavior that they had no control 
over.130 The current individual record-holder for money spent on 
loot boxes is an anonymous individual who has spent $150,000 on 
loot boxes in a mobile Transformers game.131 
Multiple surveys have been conducted that definitively correlate 
problem gambling disorders with increased loot box purchases, with 
problem gamblers spending on average four times as much money 
on loot boxes as non-problem gamblers.132 The work of David 
Zendle and Paul Cairns has focused squarely on the psychological 
effects of loot boxes on the psyches of players.133 Their studies have 
demonstrated a significant correlation between the usage of loot 
boxes and either the development or exacerbation of problem 
gambling behaviors.134 Regardless of features that would otherwise 
be used to define traditional gambling, such as a cash market value 
for loot box prizes or whether the prizes offered an advantage in the 
                                                 
127 Hong, supra note 56, at 62. 
128 Jim Sterling, The Addictive Cost of Predatory Videogame Monetization 
(The Jimquisition), YOUTUBE (July 1, 2019), 
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129 Liu, supra note 16, at 775-76. 
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game, the same positive correlation between loot boxes and problem 
gambling was found.135 
Their work has also shown that only problem gamblers change 
their spending habits when loot boxes are added or removed from a 
game.136 A study of the game Heroes of the Storm demonstrated that, 
when loot boxes were first included and then removed from the 
game, only problem gamblers decreased their in-game spending; all 
other categories spent the same amount of money as they had prior 
to the loot boxes’ removal.137 This serves as evidence that loot boxes, 
as opposed to other forms of microtransactions, disproportionately 
affect the spending of problem gamblers.138 
This research demonstrates that anyone with a gambling 
problem, diagnosed or not, will be tempted to irresponsibly spend 
more of their money than the average customer due to the 
compulsion of their mental illness. For adults, no amount or 
awareness of parental controls will help to limit their exposure to 
these dangerous scenarios, as they will be fully in control of their 
games and consoles; however, due to their mental illness, they will 
not be in control of their spending.139 
With such a large amount of capital spent, and against 
populations that should have no business putting money into 
randomized chance mechanics, public concern has begun to grow 
around the practice. The chief concern is how similar the loot box is 
to traditional gambling.140 After all, if a player can put in money and 
get a random prize as a result, was that money not a wager? Did that 
player not gamble for a random prize? These questions are 
especially concerning given that minors, one of the most profitable 
“whale” types, are given access to these “gambling” mechanics 
while all other forms of gambling are legally restricted to adults 
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136 David Zendle, Problem Gamblers Spend Less Money when Loot Boxes 
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only. Is the loot box practice just a form of gambling that is skirting 
around the law? Or even worse, openly violating it?  
 
II. GAMBLING OR NOT – THE TRICKY LEGALITY 
 
A.  Elements of Gambling 
 
Gambling has a wide range of permutations, and as such there 
are few, if any, definitions that can easily apply to all gambling. 
United States federal law, for example, has left the intricacies of 
gambling legality to the states, leaving several permutations to be 
interpreted.141 However, federal law does provide the definition of a 
bet or wager: “[A bet or wager] means the staking or risking by any 
person of something of value upon the outcome of . . . a game subject 
to chance, upon an agreement or understanding that the person or 
another person will receive something of value in the event of a 
certain outcome.”142 This is emblematic of the statutory definition of 
gambling in several states, including California (where many video 
games are developed) and Nevada (the most famous state for 
legalized gambling).143 In the context of this definition, does 
spending real money on a loot box constitute a bet or wager? 
The only easy part of the statutory definition is the second part: 
loot box outcomes are most certainly governed purely by chance.144 
However, the first part regarding consideration, and the last part 
regarding something of value, have in their nebulous definitions 
allowed developers to avoid regulation.  
 
                                                 
141 Castillo, supra note 2, at 183-84. 
142 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). While consideration is 
not explicitly stated as a term in the federal statute, other discussions of the loot 
box have used the term as analogous to the staking of something of value. Castillo, 
supra note 2, 185-87; Hong, supra note 56, 67-8; Liu, supra note 16, 771-72. 
Consideration is therefore used as the term here, remaining consistent with the 
relevant loot box legal discourse. 
143 Castillo, supra note 2, at 183-84. 
144 Id. at 187-89.  
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B.  Considering Consideration 
 
The challenge to consideration does not come from debating 
whether real currency spent on a loot box is valuable 
consideration.145 Rather, the definition is blurred because loot boxes 
can be earned through several different methods, of which real 
currency is only one method.146 
As detailed above, players in Overwatch can spend money 
directly on a set of loot boxes.147 These loot boxes are also earned 
via simply playing the game, although earning one box may take 
one or several hours.148 Other games allow purchase of loot boxes 
via the game’s own internal virtual currency, which may be earned 
in-game or purchased with real currency.149 This would normally run 
against the view adopted by a majority of U.S. jurisdictions: that 
wagering something of value is required in order to meet the 
definition of consideration.150 
However, in this majority, the opportunity for “free plays” does 
not negate the element of consideration.151 This makes sense when 
one applies the principle to the slot machine described in the 
introduction. If there existed a slot machine that gave a person a free 
spin once every three hours, and as many spins as they wanted if 
they spent enough money, few jurisdictions would find this slot 
machine negates the consideration element. “That the prize may go 
to some one [sic] who has paid nothing does not negative the fact 
that many have paid for their chance. Because some have not been 
drawn into the gambling phase does not render it any the less a 
lottery, with whatever of evil it engenders, as to the large public who 
                                                 
145 See Soto v. Sky Union LLC, 159 F.Supp.3d 871, 878-79 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 
(deciding that even virtual currency purchased with real currency is valuable 
consideration under California law). 
146 Castillo, supra note 2, at 185-86. 
147 Id. at 169. 
148 Daniel Friedman, Want Overwatch to Get Rid of Loot Boxes? It Might Get 
More Expensive, POLYGON (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://www.polygon.com/2018/9/5/17822966/overwatch-loot-boxes-skins-
events. 
149 Castillo, supra note 2, at 169. 
150 Id. at 185. 
151 See 38 Am. Jur. 2d Gambling § 2. 
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have paid.”152 The same principle applies to a loot box. Every so 
often, a player is given a loot box for free, or as many as they want 
if they pay enough in real currency. Loot boxes therefore likely 
satisfy the definition of consideration. 
 
C.  Value or Worthless? 
 
The main lynchpin on which the gambling discussion turns is 
whether the player is given something of value in the event of a 
certain outcome. In order for something to have value, courts have 
determined that whatever is won after a game of chance must have 
some form of market value.153 Whether in the form of goods, tokens, 
or pure cash, as long as the prize has some value on the market, the 
prize satisfies the definition of value for the statutory definition.154 
In general, the prizes for loot boxes do not carry any market 
value.155 They cannot be sold or traded, either between players or 
other entities.156 Once a player receives content from the box, that 
content is that player’s and that player’s alone.157 The content may 
have some subjective value to the player, and the player may have 
spent plenty of real currency to obtain the content, but once the 
content reaches the player the content is legally worthless.158 
Most games also include, as part of their software license 
agreement, that players will not sell either the content bound to a 
player’s game account or the player’s game account itself to another 
player.159 When such value has been generated in violation of a 
                                                 
152 Grimes v. State, 235 Ala. 192, 194 (Ala. 1937); see also Soto, 159 
F.Supp.3d 883. 
153 Soto v. Sky Union LLC, 159 F.Supp.3d 871, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
154 Id.; see also Mason v. Machine Zone, Inc., 851 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 
2017); Phillips v. Double Down Interactive, Inc., 173 F.Supp.3d 731, 740-41 
(N.D. Ill. 2016).  
155 See Soto, 159 F.Supp.3d at 879; see also Mason, 851 F.3d at 320; Phillips, 
173 F.Supp.3d at 740-41. 
156 See Soto, 159 F.Supp.3d at 879; see also Mason, 851 F.3d at 320; Phillips, 
173 F.Supp.3d at 740-41. 
157 See Soto, 159 F.Supp.3d at 879; see also Mason, 851 F.3d at 320; Phillips, 
173 F.Supp.3d at 740-41. 
158 See Soto, 159 F.Supp.3d at 879; see also Mason, 851 F.3d at 320; Phillips, 
173 F.Supp.3d at 740-41. 
159 Castillo, supra note 2, at 191. 
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software’s terms of service, that value will likely be declared invalid 
for the purposes of satisfying the elements of gambling, and the 
developers granted immunity from suit.160 Thus, any value to be 
extracted from loot boxes is effectively nullified. 
However, as most of the case law in the United States regarding 
value has utilized recovery under state law claims, the actual 
definition of value can vary state-by-state.161 In Kater v. Churchill 
Downs Incorporated, the case revolved around an online casino in 
which the only prizes were chips that users could use to continue to 
play the casino games.162 The chips could not be cashed out, and it 
was against the terms of service to sell the chips to any other user 
(though the chips could be transferred between users freely).163 The 
court found that, under Washington State’s broad gambling 
definitions, the chips had the effect of extending the playtime of the 
casino games and therefore constituted a thing of value for the 
purposes of state gambling regulations.164 While this case is still 
currently being litigated, it is possible that such a case may become 
persuasive authority in a future case or regulation in another state. 
Looking solely at the majority of current case law and statutory 
definitions described above, it is likely that loot boxes currently do 
not reward anything of value as a prize after a game of chance, and 
therefore likely do not meet the “value” element of gambling. Yet, 
very little case law exists to illuminate the issue. It is plausible that 
a judge may find, in light of the social pressures detailed earlier, that 
loot box prizes do indeed have value as a matter of law. 
After all, one aspect of the “value” argument seems to make no 
sense: If items in loot boxes have no value, then what exactly are 
consumers paying for in a loot box? Have they given their money 
away for something completely worthless? In the new digital 
frontier, it seems unacceptable that paid-for digital goods can be 
considered valueless.  
To use an analogy, would a raffle in which the prize was a stage 
show or a roller coaster ride be gambling? There would be no 
                                                 
160 Kater v. Churchill Downs, 886 F.3d 784, 788 n.2 (9th Cir. 2018). 
161 Id. at 788. 
162 Id. at 785-86. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 787-88. 
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“value” in the prizes, as they contain experiences that could not be 
sold or traded on the market. Yet, prizes in loot boxes would have 
more value than a stage show or a ride on a roller coaster, as they 
take the form of digital “goods.” As Rebecca McDonough contends, 
“[i]t must be acknowledged that game items have value beyond the 
video game and in the real world.”165  
Regardless, current case law and statutory definitions are 
inadequate to classify loot boxes as gambling outright. 
 
D.  The Mechanic and the Monetization: The Core Problem 
 
The loot box is not inherently a terrible mechanic on its own. On 
the contrary, a system which rewards players with semi-randomized 
cosmetic gear throughout play creates an engaging and dynamic 
progression that can spawn an infinite myriad of styles that might 
never be experimented with if players could choose their cosmetics 
outright. This assertion may not be shared by the majority of game 
players; unfortunately, and curiously, there is currently no publicly 
available study or survey that can accurately reflect player sentiment 
on their preference for loot boxes. However, again, the loot boxes 
themselves are not the problem.  
The central issue is that developers have created pathways for 
people to spend real currency on these games of chance.166 By 
offering players the ability to pay real currency in a game of chance 
for a random prize, this creates a situation so similar to actual 
gambling as to be indistinguishable.167 
Developers claim that loot boxes create an additional revenue 
stream for the company, so that they can continue to deliver content 
without having to raise the price on video games from sixty dollars 
to seventy dollars or beyond.168 This claim is faulty for several 
                                                 
165 Rebecca E. McDonough, Loot Boxes: “It’s a Trap!”, 46 N. KY. L. REV. 
62, 86 (2019). 
166 Drummond, supra note 120. 
167 Id. 
168 James Batchelor, Loot Boxes: Future of AAA or a Monetization Misfire?, 
GAMESINDUSTRY.BIZ (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2017-10-18-loot-boxes-combat-rising-
development-and-marketing-costs.  
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reasons. First, if loot boxes are creating a revenue stream that is 
supporting developers the same way that a price increase will, then 
there has functionally been a price increase in video games; the only 
difference is that the cost burden is shouldered by vulnerable 
populations instead of by customers with rational purchasing 
power.169 After all, the available evidence demonstrates that, when 
loot boxes are removed from a game, the only population that spends 
less money on the game is comprised of problem gamblers.170 
Therefore, even if the assertion is true that loot boxes ensure the 
sixty dollar price point, it is only true because vulnerable 
populations are being exploited for excess funds. Capitalizing on 
those with gambling disorders is not the solution, it is precisely the 
problem. 
Second, developers have created, adjacent to loot boxes, a 
confuse-opoly of editions for their major titles.171 These editions all 
offer more content than the game at base price and offer a multitude 
of items for each edition that can be so confusing that some 
companies are forced to create charts to better educate their 
customers.172 This confuse-opoly creates a “fear of missing out” 
(FOMO) on content in other editions, which drives consumers to 
purchase the highest-price editions possible.173 In essence, then, 
developers release a “starter price” of sixty dollars, when the 
product is expected to be actually sold at seventy to a hundred 
dollars.174 The dreaded price increase has therefore already 
functionally occurred; by exploiting players’ FOMO, the expected 
                                                 
169 Zendle, supra note 5. 
170 Zendle, supra note 136. It is important to note that the game used in the 
study did not cost $60. Rather, it has fluctuated between $10 and being free-to-
play. However, Zendle and Cairns’s work remains the only definitive study on the 
spending habits of problem gambling players in games with regard to loot boxes, 
so their findings have been extrapolated to other games in this paper. 
171 Jim Sterling, How Publishers Exploit Your Confusion and Your FOMO 
(The Jimquisition), YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZM4Dx33p57M. 
172 See Emily Heller, Which Edition of Assassin’s Creed Odyssey Should You 
Buy?, POLYGON (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://www.polygon.com/deals/2018/10/10/17959446/assassins-creed-odyssey-
editions-compared-standard-deluxe-gold-ultimate. 
173 Sterling, supra note 171. 
174 Id. 
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sale price of the game has effectively increased beyond the sixty 
dollar starter price.175 
Next, developers argue that allowing for in-game loot box 
purchases gives players who do not have much free time the ability 
to simply pay for loot boxes instead of spending the time earning 
them in-game.176 This reasoning is disingenuous. Developers 
deliberately create scenarios in which players will be tantalized 
enough to continue playing the game, but will also make loot boxes 
just difficult enough to attain that players may be tempted to 
purchase these loot boxes.177 This can be evidenced most clearly by 
the removal of paid-for loot boxes in Star Wars Battlefront II (2017). 
Before release, Star Wars Battlefront II (2017) players who paid 
for early access to the game were able to play the game a few days 
before the general public.178 However, players reported back that the 
game’s entire progression system was controlled by paid-for loot 
boxes, and iconic Star Wars characters (such as Luke Skywalker and 
Darth Vader) were locked until players paid enough “credits” (the 
in-game currency).179 Credits, of course, could be earned through 
loot boxes.180 Players quickly calculated that earning just one of 
these heroes without spending any real currency would take 
approximately forty hours of playtime.181 Developers responded to 
this criticism on Reddit by stating that the intent was to give players 
a “sense of pride and accomplishment”; this response has since 
earned the Guinness World Record of the Most Downvoted 
(disliked) Comment of All Time on Reddit.182 
                                                 
175 Id. 
176 Jernstrom, supra note 68. 
177 Id.; see also Cruz, supra note 100, at 218. 
178 Gita Jackson, A Guide to the Endless, Confusing Star Wars Battlefront II 
Controversy, KOTAKU (Nov. 21, 2017), https://kotaku.com/a-guide-to-the-
endless-confusing-star-wars-battlefront-1820623069. 
179 Ethan Gach, Unlocking Heroes in Star Wars Battlefront II Could Take a 
Long Time [Update], KOTAKU (Nov. 12, 2017), https://kotaku.com/players-are-
trying-to-calculate-how-long-it-takes-to-un-1820373111. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Paige Leskin, EA's Comment on a Reddit Thread About 'Star Wars: 
Battlefront 2' Set a Guinness World Record for the Most Downvoted Comment of 
All Time, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/reddit-
world-record-downvotes-ea-star-wars-battlefront-2-2019-9. 
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Upon the game’s release, the loot boxes remained, but there was 
no way to pay for them with real currency.183 To account for this, 
developers made loot box drops and rewards far more frequent to 
keep players engaged in the game.184 Thus, prior to the last-minute 
changes, developers had created a false choice by providing players 
with the “option” to skip over tedious playtime by spending actual 
money, a problem that the developers caused and were selling 
solutions for.185 When paid-for loot boxes got the boot, and there 
was no choice to be had, the problem magically disappeared along 
with the solution. 
Few other titles have shed the paid-for loot box model in favor 
of a non-paid-for loot box, but for those that have, the frequency and 
value of the rewards to players increased. This implies that the 
“option” given to players without much free time was not as much 
an option as it was an exploitation of the market to sell solutions 
created by developers.186 
Finally, developers claim that the increased profits for games 
ensure that employees in game companies can be supported in their 
jobs.187 However, this has factually never been the case since the loot 
box rose to prominence. At the end of the past two fiscal years, game 
developing giants Activision Blizzard and Electronic Arts (the 
largest gaming conglomerates in the United States and the most 
prominent utilizers of loot boxes globally) reported record profits, 
and at the same time fired record numbers of employees.188 Even the 
record profits offered by loot boxes could not offer all their 
employees adequate job security.189 
                                                 
183 Jackson, supra note 178. 
184 Heather Alexandra, EA Boosts Star Wars Battlefront II’s Multiplayer 
Rewards, KOTAKU (Dec. 4, 2017), https://kotaku.com/1821350257. 
185 Id. 
186 Jason Schreier, Shadow of War Is Now Microtransaction Free, KOTAKU 
(July 17, 2018), https://kotaku.com/shadow-of-war-is-now-microtransaction-
free-1827666902. 
187 Agarwal, supra note 34. 
188 See Jason Schreier, EA Lays Off 350 People in Marketing, Publishing, and 
More, KOTAKU (Mar. 26, 2019), https://kotaku.com/ea-lays-off-350-people-in-
marketing-publishing-analyt-1833575289; see also Allegra Frank, Activision 
Blizzard Cuts Hundreds of Jobs Despite ‘Record Revenue’ Year, POLYGON (Feb. 
12, 2019), https://www.polygon.com/2019/2/12/18222096/blizzard-layoffs-
february-2019. 
189 See Frank, supra note 188. 
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There is no reason why the loot box cannot have a place in game 
design. The issue is that these boxes are available for purchase with 
real currency, and games are designed to push this purchase onto 
people least equipped to resist it. Any justification as to why this 
mechanic needs to be monetized falls flat on its face the moment it 
is subjected to any scrutiny. Instead, the only commentary that holds 
any water is that these practices, when monetized, are akin to 
gambling and require regulation. 
 
III. REGULATION AND LEGISLATION 
 
A.  Historical Self-Regulation 
 
The video-game industry, due to its high throughput of 
innovation and its ever-evolving nature, has enjoyed a relative lack 
of legislative or regulatory limitation.190 Rarely have games faced 
the actual threat of regulation regarding their innovations.191 The 
only time that the video game industry has come close to 
governmental intervention was in the early nineties, when the 
overly-violent graphics of Mortal Kombat forced the industry to 
come together and form what would become the Entertainment 
Software Association (ESA), to demonstrate to the federal 
government that the industry could self-regulate without outside 
interference.192 
Most gaming regulation today is decided by the ESA, which has 
established itself as the premier trade association of the video game 
industry.193 The ESA acts as a lobbying group to legislative groups, 
as well as an advocate for the industry in court cases, including those 
that have reached the Supreme Court.194 
The ESA also oversees the ESRB.195 The ESRB gives ratings for 
games in much the same way as the Motion Picture Association of 
                                                 
190 Cruz, supra note 100, at 224. 
191 Id. 
192 Jeremy Jayne & Danny O’Dwyer, How Does the ESRB Rate Video 
Games?, YOUTUBE (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TaB-
Tp4G6WI. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
32
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol15/iss3/4
232 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:3 
America (MPAA) gives ratings for movies.196 Based on content, 
game ratings can range from an E (for “everyone”) to an M (for 
“mature”) to an AO (for “adults only”).197 These are the notable 
ratings. An E means that anyone can purchase the game, regardless 
of age.198 An M means only people 17 and over may purchase the 
game (a regulation enforced against brick-and-mortar stores by the 
ESA and ESRB).199 An AO means only people 18 and over may 
purchase the game.200 
While the distinction between M and AO seems trivial, it is in 
fact crucial. An AO rating is typically given only to games that 
include heavily mature themes, such as depicting virtual sex in a 
manner similar to pornography or including massive violence on a 
scale likely to induce domestic terrorism.201 For this reason, most big 
box retailers (Target, Best Buy, Wal-Mart, etc.) will refuse to stock 
an AO game on their shelves.202 Earning an AO rating on any game 
would be devastating to a game developer, as a significant portion 
of a game’s normal sales would be completely unavailable.203 
Although it has never done so, the ESRB has stated that any game 
that features “real gambling” would certainly earn itself an AO 
rating.204 
Given the death sentence that an AO rating brings upon a game, 
the ESA and ESRB are unlikely to ever define loot boxes as actual 
gambling, and therefore unlikely to self-regulate industry practice to 
remove the mechanics from their games.205 In fact, in 2017, the 
ESRB stated that it did not consider loot boxes to be gambling.206 
                                                 
196 ESRB Ratings Guide, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD, 
https://www.esrb.org/ratings-guide/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Mark Sammut, 19 Crazy AO Video Games the Ratings Board Banned, 
THE GAMER (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.thegamer.com/video-game-ratings-
grown/. 
202 Schreier, supra note 14. 
203 Castillo, supra note 2, at 198. 
204 Schreier, supra note 14. 
205 Castillo, supra note 2, at 198. 
206 Schreier, supra note 14. 
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The key difference, it stated, was that a prize was always guaranteed 
from the loot box, analogizing the practice to selling packs of trading 
cards.207 The ESRB reasons that though the box or pack may not 
have what a player wants, a player is still always receiving some sort 
of prize.208 In the present year of 2020, the ESRB still seems 
reluctant to change its mind regarding the issue.209  
The industry, therefore, lacked and continues to lack any sense 
of motivation to self-regulate loot boxes, and in fact explicitly 
allows for their usage. Predictably, when public concern grew over 
an industry unwilling to change, the market eventually awakened 
the sleeping bear: the threat of government regulation.210 
 
B.  International Scrutiny 
 
This Article has mentioned the FIFA series several times in 
discussing the loot box issue. This is not only because the famed 
soccer franchise is, as stated, the best-selling sports game franchise 
in the world.211 It is also because overspending on loot boxes by 
minors and people with gambling problems in FIFA specifically has 
sparked scrutiny by international regulators in areas where soccer is 
the most popular sport, most notably in the European Union. 
                                                 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 See Jayne, supra note 192; see also Luke Plunkett, A Look at How the 
ESRB Rates Games, KOTAKU (Nov. 11, 2019), https://kotaku.com/a-look-at-how-
the-esrb-rates-video-games-1839785495. 
210 The ESRB’s trading card reasoning, notably, is off the mark from the 
gambling definition discussed in Section II. Nowhere in the statutory definition 
does there have to be a lack of a prize in order to define a bet or wager. This then 
raises the question: do trading card games constitute gambling, especially in 
minor-oriented card games such as Magic: The Gathering, Yu-Gi-Oh!, The 
Pokémon Trading Card Game, or even baseball cards? Based on federal statutory 
definitions, I would argue yes, as cards happen to have market value, the only 
element loot boxes do not meet in the statutory definition of gambling. However, 
that is a topic for another paper. 
211 Arjun Reddy, FIFA's Video Game is Leaving its Competition in the Dust 
Because of 2 Key Advantages (EA), BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/fifa-video-game-leaving-
competition-in-the-dust-2019-3-1028013682. 
34
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol15/iss3/4
234 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:3 
The first countries to recognize loot boxes as gambling were the 
Netherlands and Belgium in 2018.212 After investigating several 
games that contained loot box mechanics, both countries declared 
loot boxes to be gambling and thus regulated under their own 
respective gambling regulations.213 Although several gaming 
companies disagreed with the ruling and fought to keep the practice 
in place, in the end the companies surrendered and removed the 
ability to purchase loot boxes for real currency for all users in those 
countries.214 
In 2019, after the BBC aired the stories of parents and people 
with gambling disorders struggling with loot boxes, the U.K. 
Parliament began an investigation into the nature of loot boxes and 
whether they could be considered gambling under U.K. law.215 
Although, in 2017, the U.K. Gambling Commission declined to 
define loot boxes as gambling (using similar reasoning to the 
discussion of a loot box’s lack of “value” detailed above),216 in 2019 
the U.K. Parliamentary Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport 
Committee issued a report which classified loot boxes as gambling 
and recommended that they be regulated under U.K. gambling 
laws.217 Most recently, in January of 2020, the director of mental 
health for the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS) 
recommended a flat ban on loot boxes in games, citing mounting 
evidence of gambling addiction arising in the developing minds of 
minors who are exposed to such mechanics.218 No legislation has yet 
passed the U.K. Parliament declaring this to be the actual law in the 
United Kingdom, but the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom 
has issued a manifesto making an examination of the issues 
surrounding loot boxes a priority.219 
                                                 
212 Yin-Poole, supra note 10; Tassi, supra note 10. 
213 Yin-Poole, supra note 10; Tassi, supra note 10. 
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219 Alastair Jones, The Conservatives’ Plan to "Tackle Issues Around Loot 
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Loot boxes are not only a hot topic in the European Union. In 
2017, China demanded that any seller of loot boxes disclose the odds 
of winning a particular prize in any one loot box.220 Unwilling to 
lose the Chinese market, Overwatch and others disclosed the odds 
of loot box prizes to the world.221 South Korea and Japan soon 
required similar disclosures, and companies obliged.222 However, 
the disclosure of the odds did little to curb spending, and in 2019 
China instated a new law that not only restricted the amount of time 
that minors could actually play games, but also restricted how much 
money per month they would be allowed to spend on in-game 
transactions.223 
 
C.  Domestic Legislation 
 
The United States has a complicated relationship with gambling 
as well as a lack of federal gambling statutes. Consequently, there 
has been little action taken on the part of the United States to 
determine whether loot boxes constitute gambling, and if so, how to 
deal with them. 
In 2018, the Federal Trade Commission agreed to hold 
workshops and investigate loot boxes after reading troubling 
statistics in the U.K. Gambling Commission’s reports.224 Workshops 
began in April of 2019 and are still ongoing, though the FTC’s 
consumer education specialists wrote about the subject in 2019 
following initial workshop reports.225 
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In early 2019, a bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate to impose 
a flat ban on all loot boxes and “pay-to-win” microtransactions, 
defined as in-game purchases that gave players a distinct advantage 
over non-purchasers.226 Dubbed colloquially as the “Loot Box Bill,” 
it has received bipartisan sponsorship in the Senate.227 However, as 
of writing, no other action has been taken on the bill since its 
introduction in May 2019.228 
The Loot Box Bill is a nuclear bomb on microtransactions in 
games. Instead of leaving any sort of wiggle room for games to non-
predatorily introduce these mechanics, such as by not utilizing the 
psychologically manipulative techniques described above, the bill 
instead stops most microtransactions dead in their tracks.229 Any 
game that utilizes the free-to-play model would thus be severely 
restricted as to what types of mechanics they can place in their game 
to generate additional revenue, no matter how those mechanics are 
introduced or utilized. The bill would remove paid-for loot boxes 
entirely, while simultaneously removing all other nebulously 
defined pay-to-win mechanics (such as a boost to construction speed 
in a village management game). While many consumers may cheer 
for such a future, doing so stifles innovation and creativity among 
small developers. Smaller video game developers can currently 
make a low-cost game for a phone and utilize microtransactions in 
that game to make up the cost of development, while investing any 
future profits into a higher-cost project.230 The Loot Box Bill, by 
stopping all loot boxes and other related microtransactions, would 
shut many small independent developers out of the market entirely. 
While the Loot Box Bill would certainly put a stop to the current 
iteration of revenue generation, understanding the history of how 
loot boxes became implemented in video games demonstrates that 
the loot box is not the disease. The loot box is a symptom of a far 
greater problem that incentivizes game developers to profit off of 
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those who cannot be responsible with their spending via 
psychological traps. Instead of approving overly broad legislation to 
treat a symptom and stifle innovation, alternative solutions must be 
implemented for the long term. 
 
IV. SOLUTIONS: ACTUAL AND SPECULATIVE, SHORT-TERM AND 
LONG-TERM 
 
A.  Consumers Forcing Short-Term Markets 
 
As more and more public pressure mounts on developers who 
utilize loot boxes, fewer and fewer developers are willing to utilize 
them as a source of revenue. Games that once had loot boxes as a 
revenue stream, such as Middle Earth: Shadow of War, have 
updated their games to remove them entirely.231 Newly developed 
games use a lack of loot boxes in their game as a virtue signal, 
detailing a lack of loot boxes in all of their marketing and 
promotional materials.232 As each new game announces its box-less 
intentions, consumer sentiment for that company or game rises, and 
companies are thus reinforced in continuing this cycle.233 
Additionally, improved consumer sentiment toward game 
publishers means that legislators and regulators are less inclined to 
go after video game companies for pseudo-gambling practices.234 
This raises market certainty with regards to the company’s value and 
thus improves their shareholder value and stock price.235 
David Castillo believes that the simplest and best solution to the 
loot box problem is the overwhelming force of applied public 
pressure.236 The example he uses is the effectiveness of public 
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protest in Star Wars Battlefront II (2017), which temporarily 
removed loot boxes from the game entirely.237 I agree that public 
protest is certainly an integral part of enacting change within the 
game industry, and it is certainly responsible for the initial moves 
made within the industry. However, despite overwhelming public 
protest against the practice for the past three years, public pressure 
has yet to solve the loot box issue by itself alone. 
Loot boxes are not yet completely phased out in the short-term. 
FIFA and Overwatch, among others, continue to use loot boxes and 
do not appear likely to part ways with the practice any time soon.238 
Fortnite, one of the hottest pop-culture games of the past several 
years,239 continues to utilize loot boxes in its “Save the World” 
mode, which is itself a topic of ongoing litigation concerning the 
boxes’ predatory effect on minors.240 Mobile games, as well, 
continue to utilize the practice and hunt any whale with a 
smartphone, and do not have to suffer much (if any) concentrated 
public pressure to cease this practice.241 
In the long-term, while loot boxes will be phased out, other 
methods are developing to supplement the income loot boxes once 
provided. While governments continue to chase the tail of loot boxes 
as they disappear, battle passes, long-term subscriptions, time-
savers, and seasonal content are currently being offered to capitalize 
on players’ fear of missing out and to spur them into making 
impulsive purchases for currently worthless digital goods.242 While 
this may not be strictly gambling, these techniques still apply undue 
psychological pressure on vulnerable whales to spend ever 
increasing amounts of money in Hook, Habit, Hobby models.243 
Should this trend continue unabated, stories of minors and those 
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with addictions who spend thousands upon thousands of dollars on 
games will not cease, further running the risk that governments 
around the world may implement sweeping, authoritarian rules 
similar to China’s. 
To preserve developers’ freedom to innovate, as well as preserve 
players’ freedoms to both enjoy games and to rationally and 
responsibly spend money how they choose, a more far-reaching and 
long-term solution must be achieved. 
 
B.  A New Self-Regulation: Distributor-Side 
 
Several pieces of scholarly literature regarding loot boxes have 
arrived at the same conclusion: the industry is in a position to and 
should immediately self-regulate, creating an environment 
beneficial for the consumer, the developer, and for the legislative 
body overseeing the products.244 As evidence, the literature points to 
the industry’s previous success in forming the ESRB in the first 
place. By creating a content ratings board to inform parents of the 
content in specific games, consumers were happy to know what they 
were purchasing, developers were happy to produce what they 
wanted under an informative label, and legislators were happy that 
video game violence was no longer their problem.245 
While an effective solution to video game violence, copy-
pasting the ESRB model onto the loot box practice would not be 
effective, primarily due to the ESA’s financial incentive to continue 
utilizing loot boxes in games, described above in Section III.A. With 
the ESRB, the video game industry was able to curtail sales of 
certain games to minors without a parent’s permission.246 The 
necessary solution, however, would create an environment that 
would remove the sale of loot boxes to persons of all ages, in order 
to curtail the problem not just for minors but for adults with 
gambling disorders as well. Without significant domestic legislative 
pressure, or until loot boxes are phased out in favor of yet another 
financial innovation, it is unlikely that the ESA, and therefore the 
ESRB, will ever self-regulate in opposition of their own financial 
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interests, especially when such regulation would mean a certain 
decrease in revenue from existing titles. 
However, the video game industry does not have complete 
control over their market. Over the course of the loot box’s 
development, there has been one party that has continuously 
demonstrated an understanding of consumer demand, and who has 
understood that what improved player sentiment was good for its 
business model: video game retailers and distributors. 
As mentioned earlier, big box retailers such as Target, Best Buy, 
and Wal-Mart would refuse to stock any game that had received an 
AO rating from the ESRB.247 Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo, the 
principal makers of home video game consoles, have required 
developers to disclose their loot box odds if developers want to sell 
games on a console’s digital store.248 Even Apple and Google, when 
confronted with the multitude of loot box-implementing games on 
their own digital stores, required said games to disclose their odds 
to consumers.249 
Therefore, it would be in the consumer’s and the distributor’s 
best interest for a distributor-based trade association to form, similar 
to the ESA, that would decide what games would be sold in their 
stores. This would allow distributors to control the general content 
that they would sell, and more importantly, collectively decide on 
which content they would not be willing to sell. The distributors’ 
familiarity with the product would assist in making reasonable 
regulations that could more effectively police the market, while still 
preserving developers’ ability to innovate and create more than 
overly broad and difficult-to-adapt legislation ever could. 
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The distributor association also would not be influenced by the 
increased revenue generated by loot boxes or similar mechanics. 
After all, those purchases flow directly from the player to the 
developer over a digital connection, and a brick-and-mortar 
distributor sees no increase in profit from those purchases.250 The 
ESA, by contrast, is an association made up of purely game 
developers, who all have a vested interest in a game’s increased 
profits past the initial point of sale.251 The distributor association will 
therefore be influenced only by consumer sentiment regarding 
certain games, especially when legislative and regulatory eyes 
would be upon the games (and therefore, the retailers). 
The concept of a distributor association is not new in the United 
States. After all, the MPAA is itself a distributor association, rating 
movies based purely on content and not on how much money the 
movie is expected to make.252 Granted, it is unlikely that any movies 
to date encourage viewers to engage in pseudo-gambling in the 
middle of the film, and it is unknown how the MPAA would react if 
such films were ever invented. Until that day, the point stands that 
distribution associations can effectively inform consumers and 
prevent harmful content from reaching vulnerable populations 
without monetary influence. 
By creating a distribution association, video game distributors 
will more effectively be able to control manipulative and pseudo-
legal content from ever reaching their storefronts, digital or 
otherwise, which will put enormous pressure on developers to 
conform to the association’s standards. Even as new monetization 
techniques develop, such an association could prevent the virulent 
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spread of these techniques into vulnerable populations, and thus 
curtail predatory practices far more effectively than legislatures and 
regulatory agencies. 
 
C.  Alternative Industry Regulations 
 
The video game industry has attempted to curb any legislative 
efforts against it via disclosure: disclosure of odds, disclosure of 
potential prizes, etc. So far, this practice has seen mixed results from 
various countries. In Korea and Japan, it has been an effective 
goalpost; in China minors are now legislatively banned from 
spending too much money on games.253 However, further disclosure 
has a possibility of mollifying even the most totalitarian of 
governments. 
In the current market, as McDonough describes, “[t]he user is 
buying content beyond the initial purchase price without first being 
afforded the knowledge that doing so is essentially a requirement to 
play the game.”254 Currently, the ESRB requires developers to place, 
on a game’s ratings label, an “In-Game Purchases” descriptor if the 
game contains any DLC, loot boxes, or other microtransactions.255 
However, game developers have developed ways around having 
even this content label applied to their titles, such as by adding in 
loot boxes and microtransactions months after the game’s release.256 
To address this, a regulation requiring games placed on store 
shelves to carry a prominent warning sticker regarding the average 
amount of in-game user spending for a type of game (or all games, 
generally) may be partially effective at curbing minors’ access to 
predatory games, as parents would see the increased theoretical 
price tag and be hesitant to enter into such an expensive, long-term 
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commitment in financing their child’s gaming hobby. By having 
games display such tags using data collected from previous, similar 
titles, parents can have a greater appreciation of just how much a 
game actually costs, and whether it is worthwhile to understand the 
parental controls available to them. 
Such a disclosure, while useful, would be a logistical nightmare. 
Data would have to be consistently and continuously collected, 
sorted, updated, printed, and attached to every physical copy that 
was shipped to a brick and mortar store. The developers or the stores 
themselves may carry the burden of attaching updated stickers, but 
the act of attaching them to the thousands of copies of various games 
sold each day remains a daunting task. Games would also attempt to 
skirt around this issue by claiming that they are of a different kind 
than they actually are, with no clear regulatory body to answer to for 
a mismatched type, in order to achieve the lowest warning sticker 
price possible. 
A workable adaptation of this may be a warning label akin to the 
required surgeon general’s warning on cigarette packs. The warning 
label would contain information regarding the presence of loot box 
mechanics, the average per-capita increased spending due to loot 
boxes across all major game titles, and a warning regarding the 
effect of pseudo-gambling on adolescent or mentally ill psyches. 
This would also come with simple instructions on how to access and 
utilize parental controls to keep children from overspending, which 
would overcome the educational barrier to parental controls 
mentioned earlier. 
However, such a solution would work only for physical copies 
of games sold through brick-and-mortar stores with a parent’s 
supervision. If a game is sold digitally, it can be incredibly easy for 
a minor to use a saved credit card profile to purchase as many games 
and loot boxes as the child wants.257 Parents will find it difficult to 
monitor their child’s activity as the child is playing the game, as 
much is done to obscure the prices of these loot boxes from the 
passing parent’s eye by use of virtual currencies, tricky store pages, 
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and pop-up purchases.258 If these disclosures are made online 
(similar to the FTC’s loot box warning discussed above),259 then the 
same problem regarding guiding parents to educational materials on 
parental controls occurs once more.  
These disclosures also would do little to curb spending and 
purchasing of loot boxes by adults with gambling disorders, the 
other population of whales threatened by pseudo-gambling 
practices. There would be no guardian to stop their spending until 
their finances were drained. Additionally, these disclosures would 
do little to combat time-savers, battle passes, and other feats of 
digital ingenuity that promise a recurring revenue stream through 
manipulative marketing techniques. 
Ultimately, though, I believe that requiring physical copies of 
games to be sold with a visible warning label explaining parents’ 
ability to control their child’s usage and spending in the product 
would have the ultimate effect of disseminating that information to 
enough people such that the practice would become common 
knowledge. If parental controls become commonplace, at least 
minors and their guardians can be protected from the effects of 
gambling-adjacent gaming in future. This increased awareness 
might also evolve into increased support and solutions for adults 
with gambling disorders, as well. 
 
D.  Long-Term Education and Understanding for Legislation 
 
Whether or not a distributor association forms or is successful, 
legislators and regulators must take a holistic view of the video game 
industry and its practices in order to form comprehensive and 
narrowly tailored legislation to protect both consumer interests and 
corporate innovation. For far too long the standard for regulatory 
agencies has been a general ignorance of emerging technologies and 
their effect on society. The ESA and ESRB can even help regulatory 
bodies in reaching acceptable trade practices, so long as regulatory 
bodies take an active role in the proceedings and realize that the ESA 
and ESRB, while informed, are not neutral. 
To combat loot boxes specifically in the United States, one or 
several states could recognize the loot box mechanic as falling under 
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established state gambling regulations. As previously mentioned, 
most gambling regulations are governed by the states, not the federal 
government. However, the actions of a single, powerful state, such 
as California, can influence markets for the entirety of the country. 
If California, where most video game developers are housed, were 
to define loot boxes as gambling, developers would be forced to 
remove them from games. Even if developers were willing to 
comply with such a statute in California, they would have to perform 
a cost-benefit analysis on whether it would make business sense to 
produce two separate games: one which complies with California 
gambling regulations for California consumers, and one which still 
utilizes paid loot boxes in the rest of the country. Based on historical 
precedent from California’s automobile emissions reduction 
program,260 I would predict that most developers would conform to 
California’s standard, should California adopt such legislation. 
Edwin Hong also believes that California is in prime position to 
dictate how loot boxes are implemented and utilized nationwide, if 
not globally.261 After all, a number of the largest game developers in 
the industry are based in the state.262 His argument, however, is that 
California should implement a flat ban on the loot box practice, 
based on the success that Belgium and the Netherlands had in 
removing loot boxes from within their borders.263 While a flat ban 
would be effective at removing loot boxes, Belgium and the 
Netherlands did not actually implement a sweeping ban on loot 
boxes; they merely adopted loot boxes as gambling practices under 
their respective gambling commissions.264 As stated above, adopting 
loot boxes as gambling under state law is precisely what I propose a 
state such as California should do to positively adjust the market for 
the nation as a whole. A flat ban on loot boxes would undeniably be 
effective at removing them from the practice, but without other 
careful consideration, could have disastrous ripple effects 
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throughout the industry, as described above in Sections II.D. and 
III.C. 
Despite my zeal for adopting loot boxes under existing gambling 
statutes, how this goal is accomplished must be approached with a 
great deal of care. If regulatory bodies intend to serve the overall 
public good, a significant amount of time and effort must be spent 
in fully identifying the issues at play, lest their regulations spark 
unintended consequences far worse than the prior status quo. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Loot boxes have developed as a lucrative business model to 
supplement video game developer incomes amid stagnant prices in 
a competitive market. However, the unregulated nature of the video 
game industry has led to predatory practices in foisting loot boxes 
onto unsuspecting consumers. In addition, the whale-hunting nature 
of these practices has led to the exploitation of vulnerable 
populations, such as minors and gambling addicts. The nature of loot 
box usage nearly meets the United States’ definition of gambling, 
and in international jurisdictions loot boxes are either defined as 
gambling or strictly regulated. Despite this, the United States has 
either taken inadequate or overly broad measures to protect 
consumers. In the short-term, loot boxes will be phased out due to 
market forces driving them out of software development. In the 
long-term, a trade association of video game distributors will be able 
to quickly and effectively control predatory content in games, while 
regulatory bodies should educate themselves about the industry and 
its economics before proposing further regulation or legislation. 
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